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Abstract
We provide an axiomatic characterization of a family of criteria
for ranking completely uncertain decisions. A completely uncertain de-
cision is described by the set of all its consequences (assumed to be
￿nite). Every criterion characterized can be thought of as assigning to
all consequences of a decision an equal probability of occurence and as
comparing decisions on the basis of the expected utility of their conse-
quences for some utility function.
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1 Introduction
It is common to categorize decision problems by the structure of the envi-
ronment that is assumed to be known to the decision maker. In situations
of certainty, the decision maker is assumed to know the unique consequence
of every decision which can, therefore, be usefully identi￿ed by this unique
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1consequence. In situations of risk, studied along the lines of Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947), the decision maker knows the probability distribution
over all consequences that decisions can have so that the problem of choos-
ing the ￿right" decision amounts to that of choosing the ￿right" probability
distribution over the set of consequences. In situations of uncertainty, deci-
sions are described as functions - acts in Savage (1954) terminology - from a
set of states of nature to a set of consequences. Finally, in situations of com-
plete uncertainty, or ignorance as these are sometimes called, a decision is
described even more parsimoniously by the set of all its (foreseeable) conse-
quences. The problem of ranking decisions therefore amounts to a problem
of ranking sets of these consequences.1
An excellent discussion of the di⁄erence between uncertainty and igno-
rance is provided in Pattanaik and Peleg (1984). Earlier comments on the
arbitrariness of identifying all contingencies of a decision by a set of states of
nature, which underlies the modelling of uncertainty, can be found in Arrow
and Hurwicz (1972) and Luce and Rai⁄a (1957).
In the last twenty years or so, there has been a sizeable literature that
has analyzed the problem of ranking sets of consequences in the context of
choice under ignorance. Important contributions to this literature, surveyed
by Barber￿, Bossert, and Pattanaik (2004), include Barber￿ and Pattanaik
(1984), Baigent and Xu (2004), Bossert (1989), Bossert (1997), Bossert,
Pattanaik, and Xu (2000), Fishburn (1984), Fishburn (1992), Heiner and
Packard (1984), Kannai and Peleg (1984), Nehring and Puppe (1996), Nitzan
and Pattanaik (1984) and Pattanaik and Peleg (1984). With the noticeable
exception of Baigent and Xu (2004) and Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984), all
rankings of decisions that have emerged in this literature are based on the
best and the worst consequences of the decisions or on some lexicographic
extension thereof. The limitation of these "extremist" rankings for under-
standing actual decision making under ignorance is clear enough. Suppose
we consider an investor facing two alternative investment strategies in some
completely uncertain environment. If strategy A is adopted, the investor
gains (net of the cost of investing) either one or one million dollars. If strat-
egy B is adopted, then the investor￿ s gain is either nothing, or any (integer)
amount between $900000 and $999999. Hence, the two investment strategies
can be described by:
A = f1;1000000g
B = f0;900000;900001;:::;999999g
Under the assumption that the ranking of certain (singletons) decisions is
increasing in money, most rules studied in the literature that are "monotoni-
cally increasing" with respect to the worst and the best elements would rank
A above B. Yet it is not clear that an actual investor placed under that
1A recent alternative to this approach, examined in Ahn (2008), is to view a decision
as a set of probability distributions over a more fundamental consequence space.
2circumstance would make the same ranking. For instance an investor who
would be somehow capable of assigning probabilities of occurrence to con-
sequences - even without being able to identify clearly the states of nature
and the mapping that associates consequences to states of nature - could
very plausibly rank B above A on the basis that the "expected utility" of
the consequences is higher in B than in A. The median-based ranking of
sets characterized in Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984), and which compares sets
in terms of their median consequence with respect to the underlying ranking
of certain outcomes, would also consider B to be a better decision than A
in a situation like this. So would the average Borda rule characterized in
Baigent and Xu which ranks sets according to the average Borda score of
their elements.
Another limitation of many rankings considered in the literature, which
applies also to the median-based and the average Borda rule criteria, is that
they do not allow for a diversity of attitudes toward ignorance across indi-
viduals. Consider again the case of decisions with pecuniary consequences.
If all decision makers prefer more money received for sure to less and fol-
low any particular positional rule such as the maximin, the maximax, the
median or some lexicographic extension thereof, they will all rank uncertain
decisions in the same fashion. This feature of positional rankings is clearly
restrictive. After all, the fact that two individuals prefer more money to less
and have a choice behavior that obeys the same axioms should not imply
that they have the same attitude with respect to uncertainty.
The small number of criteria that have emerged for ranking decisions un-
der ignorance is especially striking when compared with what is observed in
classical (Savagian) situations of uncertainty. In the later case one ￿nds,
along with "extremist" criteria that compare acts on the basis of their
worst or best consequence as characterized in Arrow and Hurwicz (1972)
and Maskin (1979), the well-known Expected Utility (EU) criterion charac-
terized in Savage (1954) as well as many other "non-additive" criteria such
as "Maximin Expected Utility over a Set of Priors" (characterized in Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) and Casadesus-Masanell, Klibano⁄, and Ozdenoren
(2000)) or the "Choquet Expected Utility" criterion characterized in Schmei-
dler (1989). Contrary to their "extremist" or positional counterparts, indi-
viduals whose behavior satis￿es a particular additive or non-additive EU
criterion and who have the same preferences for the consequences do not
need to have the same attitude toward uncertainty.
In this paper, we provide an axiomatic characterization of a family of
criteria of choice under complete uncertainty, or ignorance, that is quite
close in spirit to the classical EU family. Any criterion in this family can
be viewed as ranking decisions (sets) on the basis of the expected utility
of their consequences for some utility function, under the assumption that
the decision maker assigns to every consequence of a decision an equal prob-
ability of occurrence. For this reason we refer to a criterion in this family
3as to a Uniform Expected Utility (UEU) criterion. Beside the framework of
analysis, the main di⁄erence between UEU criteria and standard EU ones
lies in the uniform assumption made on probabilities. In our view, the uni-
form assumption is not unreasonable in the context of choice under complete
uncertainty. A decision maker who ignores the mechanism by which conse-
quences are produced as a function of the states of nature, and who is only
capable of identifying the set of possible consequences of a decision has a
priori no reason to believe one consequence to be more likely than another.
This principle of insu¢ cient reason, renamed "principle of indi⁄erence" by
Keynes (1921), has been, after all, the main justi￿cation given by early
probability theorists such as Bernouilli and Laplace, to their assumption
of uniform probabilities as applying to "games of chance" (see also Jaynes
(2003) for a recent justi￿cation of this principle).
The framework used to characterize the family of UEU criteria is similar
to that assumed in the literature on choices under ignorance in the sense that
we describe decisions as ￿nite sets of consequences and we propose axioms
that apply to the ranking of these sets. However, we di⁄er somewhat from
most of the literature by assuming that the universe of all conceivable con-
sequences is large and has an Archimedean structure, as de￿ned in Krantz,
Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971). While we do not, for the main results,
make explicit continuity assumptions on the framework (in particular we
do not endow the universe of consequences with a topological structure),
it is clear that a natural context to which our abstract framework could
be applied is one where the universe would be endowed with a topological
structure and the ranking of sets of consequences would be assumed to be
"continuous" with respect to that structure. We actually illustrate this by
characterizing, in theorem 3 below, the UEU family of criteria for decisions
having their consequences in Rk. Assuming such a structure enable us to
replace the Archimedean structure by a mild continuity condition.
To that extent, our framework can be usefully compared to that of
Nehring and Puppe (1996) in which the universe of consequences is en-
dowed with a topology and a continuity property is imposed on the ranking
of all ￿nite subsets of the universe. Yet continuity is not that a straight-
forward notion when applied to rankings of sets of objects even when these
objects are coming from a set endowed with a topology. For instance, a
widely used notion of continuity for sets rankings, adopted also by Nehring
and Puppe (1996), is continuity with respect to the Hausdor⁄ topology.
However this notion of continuity fails to recognize as continuous a UEU
ranking, even though such a ranking is continuous when characterized in
a Savagian (uncertainty) framework. This remark explains the di⁄erence
between our results and those of Nehring and Puppe (1996). These authors
characterize rankings that compare sets on the basis of their maximal and
minimal elements only using Hausdor⁄ continuity and a mild independence
condition (satis￿ed by UEU criteria). In contrast, we consider an abstract
4setting that is compatible (as demonstrated by our theorem 3) with many
topological structures. We then characterize a ranking that is continuous in
a very natural sense, albeit not Hausdor⁄ continuous, and one that is not
based only on the maximal and minimal elements of the sets.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been two other papers that
have provided axiomatic characterizations of UEU criteria for ranking sets
of objects. The ￿rst of them is Fishburn (1972) who characterizes the UEU
family of rankings of ￿nite sets in a discrete setting without Archimedean
structure. Yet the characterization provided by Fishburn is a direct adap-
tation of the additivity axiom of Scott (1964), Adams (1965) and Fishburn
(1970). The unappealing nature of this axiom is well known and is especially
striking when adapted to the problem of comparing sets on the basis of their
average utility. This axiom involves the construction of arbitrarily long se-
quences of set comparisons which are both di¢ cult to motivate as primitive
axioms as well as hard to verify in practice. By contrast, the special struc-
ture of our model enables us to characterize the UEU family of rankings of
sets by means of axioms that are, in our opinion, considerably easier to in-
terpret and verify. We note that one of our axiom, "averaging", is identi￿ed
by Fishburn (1972) as being satis￿ed by any ranking in the UEU family .
We show in this paper that, along with three other axioms, averaging ac-
tually characterize the UEU family of rankings of sets if an Archimedean
structure is assumed. The other paper that contains a characterization of
a UEU criterion for ranking ￿nite sets is the unpublished piece of Baigent
and Xu (2004). In this paper, the authors characterize, again without an
Archimedean structure, a ranking of ￿nite sets based on the average Borda
score of their elements. This ranking is clearly a member of the UEU family
for which the utility of a consequence is de￿ned by its Borda score. It is,
here again, interesting to notice that Baigent and Xu (2004) uses, along
with other axioms, the averaging axiom considered herein to obtain their
characterization.
While we interpret our framework in terms of choice under complete
uncertainty, this interpretation is not necessary. What we provide is an ax-
iomatic characterization of a family of rankings of all ￿nite subsets of some
universe of objects that have the property that each of them can be inter-
preted as if it was assigning some utility to every object in the universe and
as if was comparing sets on the basis of the arithmetic average of the utility
of these objects. We believe that there are other contexts where such an ax-
iomatic characterization could be useful. In this regard we note that UEU
criteria have appeared in the mechanism design literature. Barber￿, Dutta,
and Sen (2001) consider a model where n (with n > 1) agents have pref-
erences over subsets of a basic set of alternatives. A social choice function
maps n-tuples of such preferences to a subset of alternatives. They char-
acterize strategy-proof social choice functions when agents preferences are
assumed to belong to the UEU family. Beno￿t (2002) studies a similar prob-
5lem and recently, Ozy￿rt and Sanver (2006) have re￿ned and extended this
analysis. UEU criteria have also been considered by Peleg and Peters (2005)
in their analysis of Nash consistent representation of e⁄ectivity functions
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next section,
we present the formal framework and the de￿nition of the axioms and the
family of rankings. The third section presents the main results and the
fourth section provides an example of a plausible environment that satisfy
the structural axioms and in which the four substantive axioms characterize
the UEU family of rankings. The ￿fth section makes some brief remarks on
the independence of the axioms and the sixth section concludes.
2 Notation and basic concepts
2.1 Notation
The sets of integers, non-negative integers, real numbers and non-negative
real numbers are denoted respectively by N, N+, R and R+. The cardinality
of any set A is denoted by #A and the k-fold Cartesian product of a set A
with itself is denoted by Ak. If v is a vector in Rk for some strictly positive
integer k and ￿ is a real number, we denote by ￿:v the scalar product of ￿
and v. Given a vector v in Rk and a positive real number ", we denote by
N"(v) an "-neighborhood around v de￿ned by N"(v) = fx 2 Rk :j xh￿vh j< "
for all h = 1;:::;kg. Our notation for vectors inequalities is =, ￿ and >.
By a binary relation % on a set ￿, we mean a subset of ￿ ￿ ￿. Following
the convention in economics, we write x % y instead of (x;y) 2 R. Given
a binary relation %, we de￿ne its symmetric factor ￿ by x ￿ y () x %
y and y % x and its asymmetric factor ￿ by x ￿ y () x % y and not (y
% x). A binary relation % on ￿ is re￿exive if the statement x % x holds
for every x in ￿, is transitive if x % z always follows x % y and y % z for
any x, y, z 2 ￿, is symmetric if % = ￿ and is complete if x % y or y % x
holds for every distinct x and y in ￿. A symmetric, re￿ exive and transitive
binary relation is called an equivalence relation and a re￿ exive, transitive
and complete binary relation is called an ordering. Given an equivalence
relation ￿ on ￿, and some ! 2 ￿, we denote by E￿(!) the equivalence class
of ! under ￿ de￿ned by E￿(!) = f!0 2 ￿ j !0 ￿ !g. It is clear that if ￿ is
an equivalence relation, one has E￿(!) 6= ; for every !, E￿(!) = E￿(!0) or
E￿(!)\E￿(!0) = ; for every two elements ! and !0 of ￿ and
S
!2￿
E￿(!) = ￿
so that the equivalence class of all elements of ￿ under ￿ forms a partition
of ￿. Such a partition is called the quotient of ￿ under ￿.
2.2 Basic concepts
Let X be the set of consequences. While we do not make any speci￿c assump-
tions on X, it will be clear subsequently that the axioms that we impose
6makes it natural to regard this set as in￿nite. An example of a set X, con-
sidered in some detail in section 4 below, could be R, interpreted as the
set of all conceivable ￿nancial returns (either negative or positive) of some
investment decision in a highly uncertain environment.
We denote by P(X) the set of all non-empty ￿nite subsets of X (with
generic elements A, B, C, D, etc.). Any such a subset is interpreted as
a description of all consequences of an uncertain decision or, for short, as
a decision. A certain decision with consequence x 2 X is identi￿ed by
the singleton fxg. Any set with more than one consequence is therefore
interpreted as a decision involving some uncertainty.
Let % (with asymmetric and symmetric factors ￿ and ￿ respectively)
be an ordering on P(X). We interpret the statement A % B as meaning
￿decision with consequences in A is weakly preferred to decision with con-
sequences in B￿ . A similar interpretation is given to the statements A ￿ B
(￿strictly preferred to￿ ) and A ￿ B (￿indi⁄erence￿ ).
We want to identify the properties (axioms) of the ordering % that are
necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of a function u : X ! R such that,
for every A and B in P(X):
A % B ()
X
a2A
u(a)
#A
￿
X
b2B
u(b)
#B
(1)
An ordering satisfying this property could therefore be thought of as result-
ing from the comparisons of the expected utility of the consequences of the
decision for some utility function under the assumption that the decision
maker assigns to every consequence of a decision an equal probability of oc-
currence. There are obviously many criteria like that, as many as there are
logically conceivable utility functions (up to an a¢ ne transform) de￿ned on
X. We refer to any ranking that satis￿es (1) for some function u as to a
Uniform Expected Utility (UEU) criterion.
We now introduce four axioms which, as it turns out, are satis￿ed by
any UEU criterion.
Axiom 1 (Averaging) For all disjoint sets A and B 2 P(X), A % B )
A % A [ B ) A [ B % B ) A % B.
Axiom 2 (Restricted Independence) For all A, B and C 2 P(X) satisfying
#A = #B and A \ C = B \ C = ;, A % B , A [ C % B [ C.
Axiom 3 (Attenuation) For all sets A, B and C 2 P(X) satisfying A ￿ B,
A \ C = B \ C = ; and #A > #B, C ￿ A implies A [ C ￿ B [ C and
A ￿ C implies A [ C ￿ B [ C.
Axiom 4 (Pairwise Reduction Consistency) For all distinct consequences
a; b; c and d, if there are consequences e and f (not necessarily distinct) such
fa;bg ￿ feg and fc;dg ￿ ffg, then we must have fa;b;c;dg ￿ feg [ ffg.
7The averaging axiom asserts that enlarging a set A with a (disjoint) set
of consequences B that is considered worse than A is a ￿worsening￿of A
while enlarging it with a set that is better leads to an ￿improvement￿of A.
The averaging axiom is a compact version of the four averaging conditions
AC1-AC4 discussed in Fishburn (1972) and shown by him to be implied by
the UEU family of criteria (as well as by a variant of the additivity axiom
of Scott (1964), Adams (1965) and Fishburn (1970)). The averaging axiom
has also been used by Baigent and Xu (2004) in their characterization of
the average Borda ranking of sets. It is also worth mentioning that the
averaging axiom implies the G￿rdenfors principle discussed at length in the
literature on ranking sets (see e.g. Barber￿, Bossert, and Pattanaik (2004)
for a recent survey). The G￿rdenfors principle is stated as follows.
Condition 1 (G￿rdenfors Principle) for all A 2 P(X), (x 2 XnA and
fxg ￿ fag for all a 2 A) ) A [ fxg ￿ A and (y 2 XnA and fag ￿ fyg for
all a 2 A) ) A ￿ A [ fyg.
This principle, ￿rst formulated in G￿rdenfors (1976), says that it is al-
ways worth adding to a set a consequence which, if certain, is better than
all consequence in the set. Symmetrically, it is never worth adding to a set,
a consequence that is worse than all consequences in the set.
We now show that averaging implies the G￿rdenfors principle when the
ranking of sets to which the averaging axiom is applied is transitive.
Proposition 1 Let % be a transitive ordering on P(X). If % satis￿es av-
eraging, then it satis￿es the G￿rdenfors principle
Proof. Assume that A is a set in P(X) and x is a consequence in XnA
such that fxg ￿ fag for every a 2 A. Write A = fa1;:::;a#Ag and without
loss of generality, let fa1g % ::: % fa#Ag. Since % satis￿es Averaging, one
has fa1g % A and, by assumption, fxg ￿ fa1g. It follows by transitivity that
fxg ￿ A and, by averaging and transitivity, that fxg ￿ fx;a1;:::;a#Ag ￿
fa1;:::;a#Ag as required by the G￿rdenfors principle. The case where A and
x are such that fag ￿ fxg for every a 2 A can be handled by an analogous
argument.
The restricted independence axiom requires that the ranking of sets with
the same number of elements be independent of any elements that they have
in common. Adding or substracting these common elements from the two
sets should not a⁄ect their ranking. A weak form of the restricted inde-
pendence condition, applied only to the case where A and B are singletons,
plays an important role in Nehring and Puppe (1996) and Puppe (1995).
8The attenuation axiom compares the impact of adding new consequences
to two equivalent decisions that di⁄er in terms of their ￿uncertainty￿ . Con-
sider two decisions leading to consequences in A and B between which the
decision maker is indi⁄erent. Assume that the decision leading to A is
￿more uncertain￿than the other in the sense that its number of possible
consequences is larger than those in B. The Attenuation axiom asserts that
the level of uncertainty of the set ￿attenuates￿the impact, positive or neg-
ative, of adding new consequences to it. Speci￿cally, if one adds to both
sets consequences in C that are better than the existing consequences, then
the positive impact of the addition should be larger for the more certain set
than for the less certain one. As the decision maker was originally indi⁄erent
between the two sets, this means that the more certain set B will become,
when enlarged, better than the less certain set A enlarged. Of course the
attenuation goes both ways so that if the added consequences are worse
than the existing one, then adding them to the certain set will have a larger
negative impact than adding them on the less certain one.
The pairwise reduction consistency axiom requires that some consistency
be observed in the ranking of uncertain decisions having only two possible
consequences when each of these decisions is indi⁄erent to a certain decision.
Speci￿cally, assume that a decision having a or b as consequences can be
"reduced" to a certain decision leading to e for sure in the sense that the
decision maker is indi⁄erent between the certain decision leading to e and
the uncertain decision leading to either a or b. Assume also that a decision
leading to either c or d can be "reduced" in a similar fashion to a decision
leading for sure to f (where e or f are not necessarily distinct). The axiom
requires in such a case the uncertain decision leading to consequences a, b,
c or d to be indi⁄erent to the certain decision e if e and f are the same
to be indi⁄erent to the uncertain decision leading to e or f if these two
consequences are distinct. This axiom is rather weak - it only concerns
speci￿c indi⁄erence comparisons - and is only used in the characterization
of UEU family on the domain restricted to pairs and singleton provided by
theorem 1. It does not play any role in the characterization of the UEU
family of rankings that apply to sets of larger cardinality than two.
We now formally state that the four axioms are satis￿ed by any UEU
criterion. The straightforward proof of the proposition is left to the reader.
Proposition 2 Any UEU criterion satis￿es averaging, restricted indepen-
dence, attenuation and pairwise reduction consistency.
As shall be seen the four axioms of averaging, restricted independence,
attenuation and pairwise reduction consistency actually characterize the
family of UEU rankings of sets if some structure is imposed on the environ-
ment. We provide this structure by imposing four other subsidiary axioms
9on the pair hX;%i. These axioms, which we shall refer to as structural ax-
ioms, impose smoothness and richness on both the set X of alternatives and
on the ordering %. But they are not speci￿cally tailored to the UEU crite-
rion, and may even be violated by this criterion if the set X of alternatives
is too "sparse". Theorem 3 actually establishes that these structural axioms
can be dispensed with if X is taken to be Rk and if a mild continuity and
monotonicity condition is imposed on %.
Axiom 5 (Unboundedness) For every consequence c 2 X, there exists a
consequence c￿ 2 X such that fc￿g ￿ fcg.
Axiom 6 (Certainty Equivalence) For every A 2 P(X), there exists a con-
sequence a 2 X such that fag ￿ A.
Axiom 7 (Richness) For every A; B 2 P(X) ￿ X, if there are conse-
quences c￿and c￿ in X such that A[fc￿g % B % A[fc￿g, then there exists
a consequence c 2 X such that A [ fcg ￿ B.
Axiom 8 (Archimedean) Let fcig, for i = 1;2;::: be a sequence where ci 2
X for all i. Let a and b be consequences in X that are distinct from all
elements in the sequence and be such that fag ￿ fbg and fci;ag ￿ fci+1;bg
for all i;i + 1 with i = 1;2;:::. If the sequence is strictly bounded by x and
y 2 X in the sense that fxg ￿ fcig ￿ fyg for every i, then the sequence is
￿nite.
The ￿rst axiom assumes that the set of all conceivable consequence is
"unbounded" with respect to the ordering %. That is given any consequence
c, there is always another consequence which, if certain, would be considered
better than c as per the ordering %. This axiom is natural if X is taken to be
the set of all monetary consequences of a decision, at least if preferences are
increasing in money. As brie￿ y sketched in the remark following theorem 2
below, it is actually possible to prove all the results of the paper without this
axiom. Yet the complete proof involves the explicit statement and writing
additional formal arguments which, in our view, are no worth the gain in
generality thus obtained.
The second axiom assumes the existence of a ￿certainty equivalent￿to
any set of consequences. That is, for any uncertain decision there exists a
certain decision that the decision maker considers equivalent. While this ax-
iom may look intuitively reasonable, its justi￿cation requires the assumption
that there are in￿nitely many consequences in the set X. If X is a ￿nite set,
then an ordering satisfying averaging and certainty equivalence must rank
all sets as indi⁄erent to each other.
Proposition 3 Suppose #X < 1 and let ￿ be an ordering on P(X) satis-
fying averaging. Then % satis￿es certainty equivalence if and only if A ￿ B
10for all A;B 2 P(X).
Proof. It is clear that the ordering where A ￿ B for all A; B 2 P(X)
satis￿es certainty equivalence. To prove the reverse implication, write the
￿nite set X as X = fx1;:::;x#Xg and assume without loss of generality that
xi ￿ xi+1 for i = 1;:::;#X ￿ 1. By averaging, we must have, for every
i = 1;:::;x#X:
fxig % fxi;xi+1g % xi+1
Certainty equivalence implies therefore that, for every i, either fxig ￿ fxi;xi+1g
or fxi+1g ￿ fxi;xi+1g. In either case, averaging implies that fxig ￿
fxi;xi+1g ￿ fxi+1g. Hence all pairs and singletons must be indi⁄erent.
Repeated application of averaging (adding ￿rst indi⁄erent singletons to pairs
and then indi⁄erent singletons to triples etc.) now leads to the conclusion
of universal indi⁄erence.
The certainty equivalence axiom precludes from consideration some "dis-
continuous" rankings such as the "Leximin" or the "Leximax" rules studied
in Pattanaik and Peleg (1984). For instance, the Leximin rule compares sets
on the basis of their worst consequences. If a tie in the worst consequence
arises, then the second worst consequence is considered and so on until either
a strict ranking is obtained or the consequences in at least one of the sets
are exhausted. In the latter case the set which contains the most element is
ranked above. It is clear that the Leximin rule violates certainty equivalence
since it is impossible for any set containing more than one consequence to be
indi⁄erent to a singleton. It should be noted that reasonable as it sounds,
the Certainty Equivalent axiom may be violated by a UEU criterion if the
set X is not su¢ ciently rich. For instance if X is taken to be the set N of all
integers, and the u function of expression (1) is the identity function, then
the set f1;2g does not have a certainty equivalent in N.
The richness axiom re￿ ects the idea that the universe is su¢ ciently rich
to enable, by the addition of single consequences to sets, various kinds of
comparisons with the ordering %. Suppose that, starting with two decisions
A and B, it is possible to add consequences c￿ and c￿ to A in such a way
that A enlarged with c￿ is ranked above B and A enlarged with c￿ is ranked
below B. Then it must also be possible to add to A a consequence c such
that the resulting set of consequences is indi⁄erent to A. This axiom is
weak since the asserted existence of the consequence c is contingent upon
the existence of consequences c￿ and c￿ that have the required properties.
As in the case of certainty equivalence, richness is violated by Leximin and
Leximax rankings.
The Archimedean axiom has been widely discussed in the measurement
theory literature (see e.g. Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971)). It
can be considered to be a mild axiom since it ￿bites￿only when there exists
11sequences of the type described by the antecedent clause of this axiom (such
sequences are called ￿standard sequences￿in the measurement theory liter-
ature). It is trivially satis￿ed if X is ￿nite since all sequences of sets must
be ￿nite.
3 Main results
We ￿rst show that averaging, restricted independence and pairwise reduction
consistency characterizes the family of UEU criteria in an environment where
the structural axioms are satis￿ed when one restricts attention to subsets of
X that have at most two elements. It is important to note that attenuation
is trivially satis￿ed when only pairs and singletons are considered. In order
to prove this result, we ￿rst establish the following lemma, whose proof is
in the appendix.2
Lemma 1 Let X be a set of consequences and let % be an ordering on P(X)
that satis￿es averaging, pairwise reduction consistency, unboundedness, cer-
tainty equivalence and richness. Then for all (not necessarily distinct) con-
sequences a, b, c, d, e, f, g and h 2 X, if fag[fbg ￿ feg, fcg[fdg ￿ ffg,
fag [ fcg ￿ fgg and fbg [ fdg ￿ fhg, then feg [ ffg ￿ fgg [ fhg.
Endowed with this lemma, we establish the announced characterization
of the UEU family of ordering of the set of all elements of P(X) with car-
dinality no larger than 2. This result rides on the important representation
theorem in Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971) (Theorem 10, p. 295).
Theorem 1 Let X be a set of consequences and let % be an ordering de￿ned
on the set of all subsets of X of cardinality no greater than 2 and satisfying
unboundedness, certainty equivalence, richness and the Archimedean axiom.
Then % satis￿es averaging, restricted independence and pairwise reduction
consistency if and only if it is a UEU criterion. Furthermore, the u func-
tion in the de￿nition of a UEU criterion is unique up to a positive a¢ ne
transformation.
Proof. We have seen in proposition 1 that any UEU criterion satis-
￿es averaging, restricted independence and pairwise reduction consistency.
To prove the converse implication, let P1(X) be the set of all singletons in
P(X) and let Y be the quotient of P1(X) under the equivalence relation ￿.
Hence Y = fa ￿ P1(X) : fag; fbg 2 a if and only if fag ￿ fbgg. De￿ne the
binary operation ￿ on Y by a ￿ b = c i⁄ there are fag 2 a;fbg 2 b; fcg 2 c
such that fa;bg ￿ fcg. We note that a ￿ a = a (since fag [ fag = fag)
2Proofs of lemmas are in the appendix but proofs of theorems and propositions are,
when provided, kept in the main body of the text.
12so that ￿ is an idempotent binary operation. We ￿rst show that the binary
operation ￿ is well-de￿ned in the sense that, for any two (not necessarily
distinct) equivalence classes a and b in Y , there exists a unique c 2 Y such
that a ￿ b = c. Assume ￿rst that a 6= b. By certainty equivalence, there
exists c 2 X such that, for fag 2 a, fbg 2 b with fag 6￿ fbg one has
fa;bg ￿ fcg. Suppose by contradiction that there are also fa0g 2 a;fb0g 2 b
and fc0g = 2 c such that fa0;b0g ￿ fc0g. If this was the case, we would have
fa;bg ￿ fcg 6￿ fc0g ￿ fa0;b0g. By transitivity, we would have fa;bg 6￿ fa0;b0g
but by restricted independence, we should have fa;bg ￿ fa0;b0g, a contradic-
tion. Consider now the case where a = b. Suppose by contradiction, that
there are a;b;c 2 X with fag ￿ fbg such that fa;bg ￿ fcg and fag 6￿ fcg.
This contradicts averaging. We note also that the binary operation ￿ is
commutative. The next step in the proof consists in verifying that the triple
hY;%;￿i (where, by a slight abuse of notation, % is now interpreted as the
ordering of the equivalence classes rather than that of the elements of the var-
ious equivalence classes) satis￿es all conditions of a bisymmetric structure
as de￿ned in Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971) (p. 294, de￿nition
10). The property of "monotonicity" of the structure is implied, given the
de￿nition of the binary operation ￿, by restricted independence. This struc-
ture will be "bisymmetric" if (a￿b)￿(c￿d) ￿ (a￿c)￿(b￿d) for all a;b;c and
d 2 Y , . Using our de￿nition of ￿, the structure would therefore be bisym-
metric if for all (not necessarily distinct) consequences a, b, c, d, e, f, g and
h, if fag[fbg ￿ feg, fcg[fdg ￿ ffg, fag[fcg ￿ fgg and fbg[fdg ￿ fhg
implyfeg[ffg ￿ fgg[fhg. By lemma 1, this condition is satis￿ed if % sat-
is￿es averaging, restricted independence and pairwise reduction consistency.
Finally, the fact that the structure hY;%;￿i satis￿es the "restricted solvabil-
ity" and "Archimedean" properties of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky
(1971) is an immediate consequences of our richness and Archimedean ax-
ioms. Hence Theorem 10 of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971)
(p.295) applies to this structure so that there exists a mapping v : Y ! R
such that a % b i⁄ v(a) ￿ v(b) and v(a ￿ b) = ￿v(a) + ￿v(b) + ￿. Moreover,
by clause (iii) of theorem 10 of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971),
the function v is unique up to an positive a¢ ne transform. Since the binary
operation ￿ is commutative, we must have ￿ = ￿. Since the binary opera-
tion is idempotent, we must have ￿ = 0 and ￿ = ￿ = 1=2. De￿ne now the
function u : X ! R by: u(a) = v(a) for all a 2 X. The function u obviously
represents % as per (1).
Our main result extends Theorem 1 to sets with an arbitrary number
of consequences using the same axioms along with attenuation. As men-
tioned above the axiom of pairwise reduction consistency plays no role in
this extension. The idea behind the proof is to show that the unique util-
ity function whose expectation (under uniform probabilities) represents the
ranking of sets containing no more than two elements exhibited in Theorem
131, also represents the ranking of sets of larger cardinality. A key step in the
proof, provided by lemma 2, is the ability to approximate the arithmetic
mean of a set of n numbers recursively from the arithmetic means of pairs
of those numbers.
Theorem 2 Let % be an ordering on P(X) satisfying unboundedness, cer-
tainty equivalence, richness and the Archimedean axiom. Then % satis￿es
averaging, restricted independence, attenuation and pairwise reduction con-
sistency if and only if it is a UEU criterion. Furthermore, the u function in
the de￿nition of a UEU criterion is unique up to a positive a¢ ne transfor-
mation.
The proof of this theorem requires ￿ve lemmas. The ￿rst of them is
the following important one that indicates how one can approximate the
arithmetic mean of n numbers by speci￿c recursive combinations of means
of two numbers.
Lemma 2 Let U = fu1;:::;ung be a set of n numbers such that u1 ￿ u2 ￿
::: ￿ un with arithmetic mean u. De￿ne the n￿1 sequences fbi
hg, i = 1;2;::::
and h = 1;:::;n ￿ 1 by:
b0
n￿1 = (un + un￿1)=2,
b0
h = (uh + bh+1)=2
for h = 1;:::;n ￿ 2 and for i = 1;2;::::
b2i￿1
1 = b2i￿2
1 ,
b2i￿1
h =
b2i￿1
h￿1 + b2i￿2
h
2
for h = 2;:::;n ￿ 1,
b2i
n￿1 = b2i￿1
n￿1 and
b2i
h =
b2i￿1
h + b2i
h+1
2
for h = 1;:::;n ￿ 2.
Then:
lim
i!1
bi
h = u for all h = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
The next lemma establishes an implication of some of the axioms that
will be useful in the main proof.
Lemma 3 Let % be an ordering on P(X) satisfying restricted independence,
averaging, certainty equivalence and richness. Then, if A and B are subsets
of X and c is a consequence in X such that A ￿ B [fcg and fdg ￿ fcg for
some d 2 X, there exists some e 2 X such that feg ￿ fcg and A ￿ B [feg.
14Dually, if A and B are sets and c is a consequence in X such that A ￿ B[fcg
and fdg ￿ fcg for some d 2 X, there exists e 2 X such that feg ￿ fcg and
A ￿ B [ feg.
Finally, the last three lemmas show, on an environment satisfying cer-
tainty equivalence and richness, that averaging, restricted independence and
attenuation imply the following technical condition, referred to as Condition
C in the proof of theorem 2 below.
Condition 2 (C) For all distinct consequences a, b, c and d 2 X and every
set B 2 P(X) such that fbg ￿ fc;dg and B \ fb;c;dg = ;, we must have:
(i) fag % B [ fbg and fbg % fag with at least one strict ranking imply
fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg, and
(ii)fag - B [ fbg and fbg ￿ fag with at least one strict ranking imply
fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg.
The ￿rst step in proving that, on an environment satisfying certainty
equivalent and richness, averaging, restricted independence and attenuation
imply condition C is the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let X be a set of consequences and let % be an ordering on P(X)
satisfying certainty equivalence, richness, averaging and restricted indepen-
dence. Let A and B be two ￿nite subsets of X and let a, b, c and d be conse-
quences in X satisfying A [ fag ￿ B [ fbg, #A = #B, fbg ￿ fc;dg, a 6= b,
c 6= d, fa;bg \ A = fc;dg \ B = ; and b = 2 B. Then A [ fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg.
The next lemma provides the second step in the proof that averaging, re-
stricted independence, attenuation, richness and certainty equivalence imply
Condition C.
Lemma 5 Let X be a set of consequences and let % be an ordering on
P(X) satisfying certainty equivalence, richness, averaging and restricted in-
dependence and let a, b, c and d be consequences in X and B be a ￿nite
subset of X such that fag % B [ fbg, fbg ￿ fc;dg, fbg ￿ fag, b = 2 B and
fc;dg \ B = ;. Then there exists a ￿nite subset A0 of X and a consequence
a0 in X such that A0 [ fa0g ￿ B [ fbg, a0 = 2 A0 and #A0 = #B.
Combining these two lemmas, we can establish the following.
15Lemma 6 Let X be a set of consequences and let % be an ordering on P(X)
satisfying certainty equivalence, richness, averaging, restricted independence
and attenuation. Then % satis￿es condition C.
Endowed with this result, we are equipped to prove theorem 2.
Proof. Using Theorem 1, we can ￿nd a function u that uniquely repre-
sents % as per (1) on the subset of P(X) containing sets of cardinality no
greater than 2. We want to prove that the same function u can also be used
to represent % on the whole set P(X). We must prove speci￿cally that, for
any A 2 P(X) and g 2 X,
A % fgg ()
X
a2A
u(a)
#A
￿ u(g):
where u is the (unique) utility function identi￿ed in theorem 1. We prove
). Suppose #A = m ￿ n and write A = fa1;a2;:::;amg with fa1g -
::: - famg. By certainty equivalence, there exists b0
m￿1 in X such that
b0
m￿1 ￿ fam￿1;amg. Similarly, for i = m￿2;:::;1, we can ￿nd, by certainty
equivalence, a consequence b0
i such that b0
i ￿ fai;b0
i+1g. Using certainty
equivalence repeatedly, one can de￿ne this way for j = 1;2;3;:::the sequence
of consequences b
j
i by:
b
2j￿1
1 = b
2j￿2
1 ,
b
2j￿1
i ￿ fb
2j￿1
i￿1 ;b
2j￿2
i g
for i = 2;:::;m ￿ 1,
b
2j
m￿1 = b
2j￿1
m￿1
and
b
2j
i ￿ fb
2j￿1
i ;b
2j
i+1g
for i = m ￿ 2;:::;1. We ￿rst show that:
(i) fb
j
1g - fb
j
2g - ::: - fb
j
m￿1g,
(ii) fa1g - fbi
1g - fbi+1
1 g - fbi+1
m￿1g - fbi
m￿1g - famg and
(iii) fbi
1g - A - fbi
m￿1g.
If fa1g ￿ famg, then, by averaging, fa1g ￿ A, fbi
jg ￿ fa1g ￿ A for all
i 2 N and all j 2 f1;:::;m ￿ 1g and the implications (i)-(iii) are im-
mediately established. If fa1g ￿ famg, let k be the largest integer such
that fakg ￿ fak+1g. We ￿rst prove implications (i) and (ii). By averaging,
fam￿1g - fb0
m￿1g - famg. By transitivity, fam￿2g - fb0
m￿1g. By averaging
again, fam￿2g - fb0
m￿2g - fb0
m￿1g. By repeated use of transitivity and av-
eraging, one is led to the conclusion that fak+1g - fb0
k+1g - fb0
k+2g. Now,
by transitivity fakg ￿ fb0
k+1g and, by averaging, fakg ￿ fb0
kg ￿ fb0
k+1g.
Analogously, a repeated combination of averaging and transitivity leads to
the conclusion that fa1g ￿ fb0
1g ￿ fb0
2g. Hence, we have established that
16fa1g ￿ fb0
1g ￿ fb0
k+1g - fb0
k+2g - ::: - fb0
m￿1g - famg. Now, by averag-
ing, fb0
1g ￿ fb1
2g ￿ fb0
2g and, by transitivity, fb1
2g ￿ fb0
3g. Combining in this
way averaging and transitivity leads us to fb1
m￿2g ￿ fb1
m￿1g ￿ fb0
m￿1g and,
therefore, to fa1g ￿ fb0
1g ￿ fb1
1g ￿ fb1
2g ￿ ::: ￿ fb1
m￿1g ￿ fb0
m￿1g - famg.
Repeatedly using the same reasoning, we ￿nally ￿nd that, for all i 2 N,
fbi
1g ￿ fbi
2g ￿ ::: ￿ fbi
m￿1g and fa1g - fbi
1g - fbi+1
1 g - fbi+1
m￿1g -
fbi
m￿1g - famg. We now turn to implication (iii) that we prove in the
following in￿nite number of steps.
Step 1. We notice that by virtue of the G￿rdenfors principle, fb0
m￿1g ￿
A.
Step 2. We prove that fb0
1g ￿ A. Since by assumption al = al+1
for all l = k + 1;:::;m ￿ 1, we have by averaging that fb0
m￿1g ￿ famg ￿
fam￿1;amg ￿ fam￿2g ￿ fam￿2;am￿1;amg ￿ ::: ￿ fak+1;:::;am￿1;amg.
We therefore have fb0
k+1g ￿ fak+1;:::;am￿1;amg ￿ fak+1g. Now, since
fakg ￿ fb0
k+1g ￿ fak+1;:::;am￿1;amg, it follows from the attenuation ax-
iom that fak;b0
k+1g ￿ fak;ak+1;:::;am￿1;amg and, since fb0
kg ￿ fak;b0
k+1g
and % is transitive, that fb0
kg ￿ fak;:::;am￿1;amg. Applying the same rea-
soning below k enables us to reach the conclusion that fb0
1g ￿ fa1;:::;a2;amg =
A.
Step 3. Since b1
1 = b1
0, we trivially have that fb1
1g ￿ A.
Step 4. We prove that fb1
m￿1g ￿ A. Notice that fb1
1g ￿ fa1;b0
2g,
fb1
2g ￿ fb1
1;b0
2g, fb0
2g ￿ fa2;b0
3g, fb1
1g ￿ fb0
2g and the condition C (clause
(i)) imply that fb1
2g ￿ fa1;a2;b0
3g. Similarly, fb1
2g ￿ fb1
1;b0
2g, fb1
3g ￿ fb1
2;b0
3g
and clause (i) of the condition C imply that fb1
3g ￿ fa1;a2;a3;b0
4g. Repeat-
ing this reasoning, we obtain fb1
m￿2g ￿ fa1;:::;am￿2;b0
m￿1g and, ￿nally,
fb1
m￿1g ￿ fa1;:::;amg = A.
Step 5. Trivially, fb2
m￿1g = fb1
m￿1g ￿ A.
Step 6. We prove that fb2
1g ￿ A. We have fb2
m￿1g ￿ fb0
m￿1;b0
m￿2g,
fb2
m￿2g ￿ fb2
m￿1;b1
m￿2g, fb1
m￿2g ￿ fb1
m￿3;b0
m￿2g and fb1
m￿2g ￿ fb2
m￿1g.
Hence, by clause (ii) of substitution Robustness, fb2
m￿2g ￿ fb1
m￿3;b0
m￿2;b0
m￿1g.
We have also fb2
m￿2g ￿ fb1
m￿3;b0
m￿2;b0
m￿1g, fb2
m￿3g ￿ fb2
m￿2;b1
m￿3g, fb1
m￿3g ￿
fb1
m￿4;b0
m￿3g and fb1
m￿3g ￿ fb2
m￿2g. Hence, by clause (ii) of the condition
C, fb2
m￿3g ￿ fb1
m￿4;b0
m￿3;b0
m￿2;b0
m￿1g. This process can be repeated until
we obtain:
fb2
2g ￿ fb1
1;b0
2;b0
3;:::;b0
m￿1g = fb0
1;b0
2;b0
3;:::;b0
m￿1g:
17By lemma 3, there exists fc0
2g ￿ fb0
2g such that fb2
2g ￿ fb0
1;c0
2;b0
3;:::;b0
m￿1g.
Repeatedly applying Lemma 3, we ￿nd fc0
ig ￿ fb0
ig, for i = 3:::m￿1 such
that fb2
2g ￿ fb0
1;c0
2;c0
3;:::;c0
m￿1g. This, combined with fb2
1g ￿ fb2
2;b1
1g,
fb1
1g ￿ fa1;b0
2g, fb1
1g ￿ fb2
2g and clause (ii) of condition C, implies fb2
1g ￿
fa1;c0
2;b0
2;c0
3;:::;c0
m￿1g. By averaging, we have fc0
2;b0
2g ￿ fb0
2g ￿ fa2;b0
3g.
By restricted independence,fb2
1g ￿ fa1;a2;c0
3;b0
3;:::;c0
m￿1g. By averaging,
fc0
3;b0
3g ￿ fb0
3g ￿ fa3;b0
4g. By restricted independence:
fb2
1g ￿ fa1;a2;a3;c0
4;b0
4;:::;c0
m￿1g.
Repeating this process leads us to the conclusion that:
fb2
1g ￿ fa1;a2;:::;am￿2;c0
m￿1;b0
m￿1g.
By averaging, fc0
m￿1;b0
m￿1g ￿ fb0
m￿1g ￿ fam￿1;amg. By restricted inde-
pendence:
fb2
1g ￿ fa1;a2;:::;am￿2;am￿1;amg = A.
Step 7. Trivially, fb3
1g = fb2
1g ￿ A.
Step 8. We prove that fb3
m￿1g ￿ A. We have fb3
1g ￿ fb1
1;b2
2g, fb3
2g ￿
fb3
1;b2
2g, fb2
2g ￿ fb1
2;b2
3g and fb2
2g ￿ fb3
1g. Hence, by clause (i) of condition
C, fb3
2g ￿ fb1
1;b1
2;b2
3g. We also have fb3
3g ￿ fb3
2;b2
3g, fb2
3g ￿ fb1
3;b2
4g and
fb2
3g ￿ fb3
2g. Hence, by clause (i) of condition C, fb3
3g ￿ fb1
1;b1
2;b1
3;b2
4g.
Continuing this process, we obtain fb3
m￿2g ￿ fb1
1;b1
2;:::;b1
m￿2;b2
m￿1g. Re-
peatedly applying Lemma 3, we ￿nd c1
i such that fc1
ig ￿ fb1
ig, for i =
1:::m ￿ 2 such that fb3
m￿2g ￿ fc1
1;c1
2;:::;c1
m￿2;b2
m￿1g. This, combined
with fb3
m￿1g ￿ fb2
m￿1;b3
m￿2g, fb2
m￿1g ￿ fb0
1;b1
m￿2g, fb2
m￿1g ￿ fb3
m￿2g and
clause (i) of condition C, implies that:
fb3
m￿1g ￿ fc1
1;c1
2;:::;c1
m￿2;b1
m￿2;b0
m￿1g.
By averaging and restricted independence:
fb3
m￿1g ￿ fc1
1;:::;c1
m￿3;b1
m￿3;b0
m￿2;b0
m￿1g:
By repeatedly combining averaging and restricted independence in this way,
one is led to the conclusion that:
fb3
m￿1g ￿ fc1
1;b1
1;b0
2;b0
3;:::;b0
m￿1g:
Repeatedly applying lemma 3, one ￿nds d1
i such that fd1
ig ￿ fb0
ig, for i =
2:::m ￿ 1 for which:
fb3
m￿1g ￿ fc1
1;b1
1;d0
2;d0
3;:::;d0
m￿1g:
18Repeatedly applying averaging and restricted independence, we obtain fb3
m￿1g ￿
fa1;a2;:::;am￿2;:::;am￿1;amg = A.
Step 9. Trivially, fb4
m￿1g = fb3
m￿1g ￿ A.
Steps 6 to 9 can clearly be repeated for ever using the same argument and
this remark completes the proof of (iii). Now, using certainty equivalence,
let x be a consequence such that A ￿ fxg. The mapping u that we found
using Theorem 1 represents % and, so, u(bi
1) ￿ u(x) ￿ u(bi
m￿1) for all i 2 N.
Now it is easy to check that the sequence fu(bi
h)g for every h are just like
the sequences studied in lemma 2. Because of this lemma, we have that
lim
t!1
u(bt
1) = lim
t!1
u(bt
m￿1) =
X
a2A
u(a)
#A
:
Hence, u(x) =
X
a2A
u(a)
#A . By transitivity, A % fgg i⁄fxg % fgg i⁄
P
a2A
u(a)
#A ￿
u(g).
Remark 1 The strategy for proving the results of theorem 2 without the
unboundedness axiom would be as follows. If X has maximal elements, we
de￿ne the set X0 as X without its maximal elements. Thanks to Averaging
and Certainty Equivalence, X0 is unbounded. We use Theorem 2 to prove the
existence of a UEU criterion on X0 and we then show that the mapping u,
de￿ned on X0, can be extended to X by de￿ning, for every maximal element
t of X, u(t) by u(t) = sup
x2X0
u(x).
4 An interpretation of the structural environment
We now show that if one imposes a natural structure on the set X and the
ordering % from the outset, there is no need to resort to unboundedness, cer-
tainty equivalence, richness and the Archimedean axiom to characterize the
UEU family of orderings. Speci￿cally, this family will then be characterized
by averaging, restricted independence, attenuation and pairwise reduction
consistency only.
Assume that X is an unbounded (from above)3 closed and arc-connected4
subset of Rk, that we could interpret as the set of all consumption bundles
that the decision maker can obtain out of an uncertain decision (taking
k = 1 would obviously cover the case where consequences are pecuniary).
3Again, it is possible to avoid this unboundedness assumption.
4A subset A of a topological space is arc-connected if, for any two elements x and y of
A, there exists a continuous function f from [0;1] to A such that f(0) = x and f(1) = y.
19Assume also that the ordering % is increasing when restricted to singletons
(that is, for every x and y 2 Rk, x ￿ y implies fxg % fyg and x > y implies
fxg ￿ fyg) and satis￿es the following continuity condition.
Condition 3 (Continuity) For every set A 2 P(X), and consequences y
and z 2 X, the sets B(A) = fx 2 X : fxg % Ag and W(A) = fx 2 X : A ￿
fxgg are both closed in X.
This continuity condition says that a small change in a bundle should
not a⁄ect drastically the ranking of a decision leading to this bundle for sure
vis-￿-vis any set. Notice that this continuity condition, which only concerns
comparisons of sets vis-￿-vis singletons is much weaker than the (Vietoris)
continuity condition examined in Nehring and Puppe (1996) which restricts
the comparisons of any two sets in a way that is even incompatible with the
UEU family of set rankings.
We now establish, in the following theorem, that in this environment,
the UEU family of rankings of P(X) is characterized by averaging, restricted
independence, attenuation and pairwise reduction consistency.
Theorem 3 Let X be an unbounded arc-connected subset of Rk and let
% be an ordering of P(X) that is monotonic when restricted to singletons
and which satis￿es the continuity condition. Then % satis￿es averaging, re-
stricted independence, attenuation and pairwise combination consistency if
and only if it is a UEU criterion.
Proof. We know from proposition 1 that a UEU criterion satis￿es av-
eraging, restricted independence, attenuation and pairwise combination con-
sistency on any environment. Conversely, let X be an arc-connected subset
of Rk and let % be an ordering of P(X) satisfying the continuity condi-
tion as well as averaging, restricted independence, attenuation and pairwise
reduction consistency. We will prove that under these conditions, % sat-
is￿es unboundedness, certainty equivalence, richness and the Archimedean
axiom. Using theorems 1 and 2, the conclusion that % is a UEU criterion
will then follow immediately. We ￿rst notice that, under averaging, if the
sets B(A) = fx 2 X : fxg % Ag and W(A) = fx 2 X : A ￿ fxgg are closed
in X for every A, then so are the sets e B(A) = fx 2 X : A [ fxg % Ag and
f W(A) = fx 2 X : A ￿ A[fxgg. To see that, assume by contraposition that,
say, e B(A) is not closed (the argument for f W(A) is similar) . Then, there
exists a sequence fxtg t = 1;:::converging to some limit x such that:
A [ fxtg % A
for all t and
A ￿ A [ fxg
20where the last strict ranking is obtained from the assumption that % is com-
plete. Since % is also re￿exive, this strict ranking implies therefore that
x = 2 A. By averaging one has therefore:
A ￿ fxg (2)
Now, since A is ￿nite, and xt is a sequence converging to x, either xt is
a ￿nite sequence or xt is in￿nite. If xt is ￿nite, then, by de￿nition of a
sequence converging to x, there exists some s ￿ t for which xs = x = 2 X.
But given averaging, this is incompatible with the de￿nition of the sequence
xt as satisfying A [ fxtg % A for every t. Hence we must conclude that xt
is in￿nite. If this is the case, there must exists, since A is ￿nite, an in￿nite
subsequence e xt of xt converging to x and such that e xt = 2 A for every t. Since
for every t, we have
A [ fe xtg % A
it follows from averaging that we also have:
fxtg % A
which, given (2), gives us the required contradiction of the closedness of the
set B(A). Let us now prove that % satis￿es the four structural axioms.
Unboundedness : This property is clearly satis￿ed if X is unbounded and
% is monotonic when restricted to singletons.
Certainty Equivalence: Consider any set A 2 P(X) and, without loss
of generality, write it as A = fa1;:::;a#Ag with fahg - fah+1g for h =
1;:::;#A ￿ 1. By averaging (and speci￿cally the Gardenf￿rs principle) one
has that A % fa1g and fa#Ag % A so that none of the closed sets fx 2
X : fxg % Ag and fx 2 X : A ￿ fxgg is empty. Since % is com-
plete, X = fx 2 X : fxg % Ag [ fx 2 X : A ￿ fxgg. Since X
is arc connected, there exists a continuous function f : [0;1] ! X such
that f(0) = a1 and f(1) = a#A. By continuity, given the closedness of
fx 2 X : fxg % Ag and fx 2 X : A % fxgg, there must be some ￿ 2 [0;1]
such that f(￿) 2 fx 2 X : fxg % Ag \ fx 2 X : A % fxgg. By de￿nition
ff(￿)g ￿ A.
Richness: Consider sets A and B in P(X) and bundles c￿and c￿ 2 X such
that A[fc￿g % B % A[fc￿g. If either A[fc￿g ￿ B or B ￿ A[fc￿g, then
richness is satis￿ed and there is nothing to be proved. Assume therefore that
A [ fc￿g ￿ B ￿ A [ fc￿g (3)
holds. let 1k denote the unit vector in Rk
+. Since % restricted to singletons
is continuous and increasing, there exists, for each x 2 X, a real number
21v(x) such that fv(x):1kg ￿ fxg. By restricted independence, one has:
A [ fv(c￿):1kg ￿ A [ fc￿g ￿ B ￿ A [ fc￿g ￿ A [ fv(c￿):1kg (4)
De￿ne then h(x) by:
fh(x):1kg ￿ A [ fx:1kg
The number h(x) exists by virtue of the fact that, as we have just checked, %
satis￿es certainty equivalence. Moreover h(x) is clearly unique if % restricted
to singletons is increasing. Hence h is a function from X to R. It must also
be a continuous function if, as established above, e B(A) and f W(A) are both
closed in X. For suppose h is not continuous at some x 2 X. This means
that there exists a number " > 0 for which, for every number ￿ > 0, one
can ￿nd x0 2 N￿(x) such that h(x0) = 2 N"(h(x)). Since % is complete, either,
non-exclusively, x0 2 B(A) or x0 2 W(a). Since these two sets are closed,
and x0 is arbitrarily close to x, h(x0) must also be arbitrarily close to h(x):
Let now v(B) be de￿ned by:
fv(B):1kg ￿ B
Because of (3) and (4), one has that h(c￿) > v(B) > h(c￿). By arc connect-
edness, let f be a continuous function from [0;1] to X satisfying f(0) = c￿
and f(1) = c￿. Consider now the function ￿ : [0;1] ! [h(c￿);h(c￿)] de￿ned
by:
￿(￿) = h(f(￿))
This function, which composes two continuous function is continuous and
satis￿es ￿(0) = h(c￿) and ￿(1) = h(c￿). By the intermediate value theorem,
there must be some ￿ 2 [0;1] such that ￿(￿) = h(f(￿)) = V (B). By
de￿nition of f and h, this implies the existence of some x 2 X satisfying
h(x) = V (B) such that
B ￿ fh(x):1kg ￿ A [ fx:1kg
Archimedean axiom: If it is impossible to construct a standard sequence
as in the antecedent clause of the Archimedean axiom, then the proof is
(trivially) over. Assume therefore that such a sequence exists and, therefore
that a and b be two bundles of k goods such that fag ￿ fbg for which one
has, for a sequence of bundles fctgt2N+ :
fct;ag ￿ fct+1;bg (5)
for every t = 0;:::. By restricted independence, we must have fct+1g ￿ fctg
for all t. By restricted independence again, one has:
fbt;ag ￿ fbt+1;bg
22for every consumption bundles bt and bt+1 in Rk
+ such that fbtg ￿ fctg
and fbt+1g ￿ fct+1g. Since % restricted to singletons induces a continuous
ranking of Rk
+, there exists, for every t = 0;:::;, a real number ￿t such that:
f￿t:1kg ￿ fctg
Hence the existence of a sequence of bundles fctgt2N+ satisfying (5) implies
the existence of a sequence of real numbers f￿tgt2N+ such that:
f￿t:1k;ag ￿ f￿t+1:1k;bg (6)
Since fct+1g ￿ fctg for all t, we must have, since the ordering % restricted
to singletons is increasing, that ￿t+1 > ￿t for all t. As the increasing
sequence fctgt2N+ is initiated somewhere, it is bounded from below so that
there exists some bundle x for which fctg ￿ fc0g % fxg. Now, since every
increasing sequence of numbers that is bounded from above is either con-
vergent or ￿nite, the only thing we need to check is that the sequence is
not convergent. Suppose by contradiction that the sequence f￿tg is in￿nite
and converges to some number ￿. By restricted independence (implied by
proportional expansion consistency), we know that:
f￿:1k;ag ￿ f￿:1k;bg
By continuity and restricted independence, the set fx : fx;ag % fx;bgg is
closed. Because of this, there exists a number " > 0 such that:
f￿0:1k;ag ￿ f￿00:1k;bg
for all ￿0 and ￿00 2 N"(￿). Assuming the sequence f￿tg to be converging
to ￿ implies the existence of some positive integer s such, for all t ￿ s, ￿t
2 N"(￿). By the continuity condition, we must therefore have:
f￿t:1k;ag ￿ f￿t+1:1k;bg
for any such t, which contradicts the de￿nition of ￿t provided by (6). Hence
the increasing sequence f￿tg is not convergent and must therefore be ￿nite.
5 Independence of the axioms
We do not know whether our four substantive axioms (averaging, restricted
independence, attenuation, and pairwise reduction consistency) are inde-
pendent on an environment satisfying unboundedness, certainty equivalent,
richness and the Archimedean axiom. Yet we can show on such an environ-
ment that there are orderings that satisfy averaging and pairwise combina-
tion consistency without satisfying the other axioms. Furthermore, it is easy
23to exhibit, in an environment that does not satisfy the structural axioms,
examples of orderings that violate averaging but satisfy all three other ax-
ioms. A good example of such an ordering is the ranking of sets based on
their number of elements. This cardinality ranking of sets satis￿es indeed
restricted independence and, trivially, attenuation and pairwise reduction
consistency but violates averaging.
A family of orderings of P(X) that generalizes the UEU family is that
which contains all orderings % of P(X) that can be de￿ned, for every sets
A and B in P(X), by:
A % B ()
X
a2A
p(a)u(a)
X
a2A
p(a)
￿
X
b2B
p(b)u(b)
X
b2B
p(b)
(7)
for some real-valued functions u and p both having X as domain. Any UEU
criterion is a member of this family that satis￿es the additional property
that, for all consequences x 2 X, p(x) = c for some real number c. Orderings
that can be represented as per (7) for some real-valued functions u and p can
be thought of as comparing sets on the basis of the expected utility of their
consequence, but without imposing the requirement on the probability of
all consequences to be the same. This interpretation obviously requires that
we can interpret p(x) as a probability, which in turns required that some
measure-theoretic structure be imposed on X. But if we can provide this
interpretation, any ordering of P(X) that can be represented as per (7) can
be viewed as comparing sets on the basis of their expected utility conditional
of being in the sets. It is straightforward to verify that any ordering that
can be represented as per (7) satis￿es averaging.
Furthermore there are members of this family that satisfy pairwise reduc-
tion consistency but that violate attenuation and restricted independence.
To see this, assume that X = R++ and de￿ne % by:
A % B ,
X
a2A
a
X
a2A
1
a
￿
X
b2B
b
X
b2B
1
b
. (8)
This ordering is clearly a member of the family represented as per (7) where
p is de￿ned by p(x) = 1
x and u by u(x) = x2. It is straightforward to verify
that this ordering satis￿es pairwise combination consistency but violates
attenuation and restricted independence.
6 Conclusion
This paper has characterized by four axioms the UEU ranking of completely
uncertain decisions, under the assumption that the ranking of uncertain
24decision is used in an Archimedean and rich environment where any set has
a certainty equivalent. The axioms used in the characterization are ￿nite
and, therefore, veri￿able from the mere observation of a choice behavior.
Yet we have failed to prove that the axioms were "minimal" in the sense of
being logically all independent.
A limitation of the UEU criterion is that it assigns to every consequence
of a decision the same probability of occurrence. A next step in the research
agenda is therefore to identify the properties of a more general EU criterion
that does not impose this uniform assumption on the probabilities assigned
to the consequences of a decision. The family of orderings that can be rep-
resented as per (7) for some functions p and u is an obvious ￿rst step into
that direction. We have seen that any ordering in this family satis￿es av-
eraging but that there are orderings in that family who violate attenuation
and proportional expansion consistency. It would be nice to know the ax-
ioms which, along with averaging, characterize this large family of rankings
of completely uncertain decisions. A characterization of this family in the
somewhat speci￿c context in which the consequences of decisions are lot-
teries de￿ned over a fundamental set of consequences - rather than ￿nal
consequences - has been obtained recently in an interesting paper by Ahn
(2008). Obtaining a characterization of this family in our context seems to
be a high priority for future research.
7 Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
Suppose that consequences a, b, c, d, e, f, g and h 2 X are such that
fag [ fbg ￿ feg, fcg [ fdg ￿ ffg, fag [ fcg ￿ fgg and fbg [ fdg ￿ fhg. We
need to prove that feg[ffg ￿ fgg[fhg. Suppose by contradiction and without
loss of generality that feg[ffg ￿ fgg[fhg. By certainty equivalence, there are
consequences v0 and v1 such that fv0g ￿ feg [ ffg and fv1g ￿ fgg [ fhg. By
transitivity, one has fv0g ￿ fv1g which, given the re￿ exivity of %, implies v0 6= v1.
By certainty equivalence, there exists a consequence v such that fvg ￿ fv0;v1g. By
averaging and transitivity, one has feg[ffg ￿ fv0g ￿ fvg ￿ fv0;v1g ￿ fv1g ￿
fgg [ fhg. Similarly, applying recursively averaging and certainty equivalence in
this fashion, one can ￿nd an in￿nite sequence of consequences v, v0, v00, etc. in X
such that feg [ ffg ￿ fvg ￿ fv0g ￿ fv00g ￿ ::: ￿ fgg [ fhg.
Choose now a0distinct from b, c and d and such that fag ￿ fa0g. The existence
of a0 is of course secured by the unboundedness axiom. Using certainty equivalence,
consider e0such that fe0g ￿ fa0;bg. We can choose a0 in such a way that feg [
ffg ￿ fe0g [ ffg ￿ fgg [ fhg. Indeed, given the fact that fag [ fbg ￿ feg, we
know from restricted independence that feg ￿ fe0g and feg[ffg ￿ fe0g[ffg.
Now, if fe0g [ ffg % fgg [ fhg, the richness axiom implies the existence of a
consequence e00 such that fe00g[ffg ￿ fb vg for some b vsuch that feg[ffg ￿ fb vg ￿
25fgg [ fhg. From restricted independence, we must have feg ￿ fe00g ￿ fe0g. By
richness again, there exists some consequence a00such that fe00g ￿ fa00;bg. Hence,
setting a00 = a0and e0 = e00gives us the required conclusion that feg [ ffg ￿
fe0g [ ffg ￿ fgg [ fhg.
Using a similar reasoning, one can ￿nd consequences b0, c0and d0all pairwise
distinct from each others and from a0such that:
(i)fbg ￿ fb0g and feg[ffg ￿ fe00g[ffg ￿ fgg[fhg for some consequence
e00such that e00 ￿ fa0;b0g.
(ii) fcg ￿ fc0g and feg[ffg ￿ fe00g[ff0g ￿ fgg[fhg for some consequence
f0such that f0 ￿ fc0;dg.
(iii).fdg ￿ fd0g and feg [ ffg ￿ fe00g [ ff00g ￿ fgg [ fhg for some
consequence f00such that f00 ￿ fc0;d0g.
The consequences a0, b0, c0and d0can all be chosen to be distinct because there
are in￿nitely many v0 such that feg [ ffg ￿ fv0g ￿ fgg [ fhg. Using certainty
equivalence, de￿ne g0and h0by fg0g ￿ fa0;c0g and fh0g ￿ fb0;d0g. By restricted
independence, one has fgg ￿ fg0g, fhg ￿ fh0g and fgg [ fhg ￿ fg0g [ fh0g.
We therefore have feg [ ffg ￿ fe00g [ ff00g ￿ fgg [ fhg ￿ fg0g [ fh0g. Yet
the axiom of pairwise reduction consistency implies, in view of (i) and (ii) that
fe00g [ ff00g ￿ fa0;b0;c0;d0g ￿ fg0g [ fh0g, a contradiction.
Proof of lemma 2.
We ￿nd useful to represent the sequence de￿ned in this lemma in the following
array, with n ￿ 1 columns and an in￿nite number of rows:
1 2 ... n ￿ 2 n ￿ 1
b0 (u1 + b0
2)=2 (u2 + b0
3)=2 ...  (un￿2 + b0
n￿1)=2 (un￿1 + un)=2
b1 (u1 + b0
2)=2 (b1
1 + b0
2)=2 !... (b1
n￿3 + b0
n￿2)=2 (b1
n￿2 + b0
n￿1)=2
b2 (b2
2 + b1
1)=2 (b2
3 + b1
2)=2 ...  (b2
n￿1 + b1
n￿2)=2 (b1
n￿2 + b0
n￿1)=2
b3 (b2
2 + b1
1)=2 (b3
1 + b2
2)=2 !... (b3
n￿3 + b2
n￿2)=2 (b3
n￿2 + b2
n￿1)=2
... ... ... ... ... ...
We are going to show that the "grand" sequence that starts from the "north-
east" of the array and follows the arrows up to in￿nity, converges to u. Since the
sequence fbi
hg is the hthcolumn of this array and therefore, a subsequence of the
grand sequence, the conclusion of the lemma would follow immediately. De￿ne
accordingly the grand sequence fb btg, for t = i(n ￿ 1) + 1;:::;(i + 1)(n ￿ 1), and
i = 0;1;2;:::by:
b bt = bi
n￿(t+1￿(i(n￿1)+1)) if i is even and
b bt = bi
t+1￿(i(n￿1)+1) if i is odd
Any element of the grand sequence can be written as a weighted average of
fu1;:::;ung. In particular, for all t = 1;:::, there exists n ￿ 1 real numbers
26￿t
1;:::;￿t
n￿1 such that:
b bt = ￿t
1u1 + ￿t
2u2 + :::: + ￿t
n￿1un￿1 + ￿t
n￿1un
Moreover inspection reveals that ￿t
h is de￿ned by the following recursive formula:
￿t
h = 0 if t 2 f1;:::;n ￿ h ￿ 1g
￿n￿h
h =
1
2
and
￿t
h =
1
2
(￿t￿1
h + ￿
2m(t)￿t+1
h if t ￿ n ￿ h + 1 (9)
where m(t) is de￿ned as the largest integer strictly smaller than t that is divisible
by n￿1. In order to prove the lemma, it su¢ ces to prove that lim
t!1
￿t
h = 1
nfor all
h. In what follows we will ￿x h 2 f1;::;n￿1g and drop the subscript h from the
sequence f￿t
hg for notational convenience.
Once again, it is convenient to refer to the aforementioned representation of the
sequence f￿tg, t = 1;::as an array with n ￿ 1 columns and an in￿nite number of
rows. We start from the ￿rst row with ￿1and move left until we reach ￿n￿1. We
then move down to the second row where the ￿rst element from the left is ￿n. The
sequence then increases from left right and the right-most element in the this row
is ￿2n￿2. The right-most element in the third row is then ￿2n￿1 and the sequence
increases as it moves left (like in the ￿rst row) so that the left-most element is
￿3n￿3 and so on. Let t be an arbitrary integer. If we write t = m(t) + s, it
follows that ￿t lies in the (m(t) + 1)th row of this array. If m(t) is even then,
the (m(t) + 1)th row is increasing from right to left so that ￿t is the (s + 1)th
element from the right in this row. If m(t) is odd, then ￿t is the (s+1)th element
from the left in the (m(t) + 1)th row which increases from left to right. It follows
that in this array, ￿t for t > n ￿ 1 is the arithmetic mean of the element which
immediately precedes it and the element directly in the row above.
The proof proceeds in two steps. The ￿rst is to show that the sequence f￿tg,
t = 1;:::is convergent and the second is to show that the limit of the sequence
is, in fact 1
n. In order to establish the ￿rst step, we ￿rst record the two following
properties P1and P2 of the sequence which can be easily veri￿ed.
P1. Let r > 1 be an odd integer. The sequence strictly increases from ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1
to ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h and then strictly decreases from ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h to ￿r(n￿1). If
r is an even integer, then the sequence strictly increases from ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 to
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h and strictly decreases from ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h to ￿r(n￿1). Thus
for every row r in the array, the sequence increases from the right as we move
left for h terms and then decreases for the remaining n ￿ h ￿ 1 terms. Clearly
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h is the largest element of the rth row if r is odd and ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h
if r is even. Note that the maximal element of any row is in the hthcolumn from
the right.
27P2. Let t = (n ￿ 1)r + s where m(t) = r (note that 1 ￿ s ￿ n ￿ 1). Then
￿t = 1
2￿(n￿1)(r￿1)+(n￿s) + 1
22￿(n￿1)(r￿1)+(n￿s￿1) + :::: + 1
2s￿1￿(n￿1)(r￿1)+1 +
1
2s￿1￿(n￿1)(r￿1). Thus each term of the sequence can be expressed as the weighted
sum of the terms of the sequence in the row above.
CLAIM: Let r > 1 be an integer. Then:
(i) ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿r(n￿1) < ￿1(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+1) and
(ii) ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 < ￿2(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1))
where ￿1 = 2n￿h￿1￿1
2n￿h￿1 and ￿2 = 2h￿1￿1
2h￿1 if r is odd and:
(iii) ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 < ￿1(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)) and,
(iv) ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿r(n￿1) < ￿2(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+1)
if r is even.
Proof of the Claim: We ￿rst prove (ii). We do that by ￿rst noting that, according
to P2:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h =
1
2
￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h+:::+
1
2h￿1￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1+
1
2h￿1￿(r￿1)(n￿1)
Since ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 = ￿(r￿1)(n￿1) and ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h is the largest term in the
(r ￿ 1)th row according to P1, we conclude that :
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 < ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+h(
1
2
+ ::: +
1
2h￿1)
￿(1 ￿
1
2h￿1)￿(r￿1)(n￿1)
= (1 ￿
1
2h￿1)(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n+h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1))
Since ￿2 = (1 ￿ 1
2h￿1), this establishes (ii).
We now prove (iii). According to P2:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h =
1
2
￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+h+:::+
1
2n￿h￿1[￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1+￿(r￿1)(n￿1)]
Since ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 = ￿(r￿1)(n￿1) and since, from P1, we know that ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+h
is the largest term in the (r ￿ 1)th row, we obtain:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 < (
1
2
+ ::: +
1
2n￿h￿1)￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h
￿ (1 ￿
1
2n￿h￿1)￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1
= (1 ￿
1
2n￿h￿1)(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1)
Since ￿2 = (1 ￿ 1
2n￿h￿1), this establishes (iii).
28We now prove (i). Applying P2, we have:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h =
1
2
￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h + ::: +
1
2h￿1￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1
+
1
2h￿1￿(r￿1)(n￿1)
and:
￿r(n￿1) =
1
2
￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+1 + ::: +
1
2n￿h￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h
+ :::: +
1
2n￿2￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 +
1
2n￿2￿(r￿1)(n￿1)
We thus have:
￿ = ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿r(n￿1)
= (
1
2
￿
1
2n￿h)￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h + :::: + (
1
2h￿1 ￿
1
2n￿2)￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1
+ (
1
2h￿1 ￿
1
2n￿2)￿(r￿1)(n￿1)
￿
1
2
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1::::: ￿
1
2n￿h￿1￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h￿1
Note that, according to P1, ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h is the largest element in its row.
This, combined to the fact that:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 < ::: < ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h￿1
implies:
￿ < ((
1
2
￿
1
2n￿h) + :::: + (
1
2h￿1 ￿
1
2n￿2)
+ (
1
2h￿1 ￿
1
2n￿2))￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h
￿ (
1
2
+ :::: +
1
2n￿h￿1)￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+1
= (
1
2
￿
1
2n￿h)(1 + :::: +
1
2h￿2) + (
1
2h￿1 ￿
1
2n￿2))￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h
+ (1 ￿
1
2n￿h￿1)￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1
= (
1
2
￿
1
2n￿h)(2 ￿
1
2n￿h) + (
1
2h￿1 ￿
1
2n￿2))￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+1
+ (1 ￿
1
2n￿h￿1)￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1
= (1 ￿
1
2n￿h￿1)(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1)
= ￿1(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1)
29which proves (i).
The proof of (iv) is symmetric to that of (i) and we omit the details.
We will use the inequalities in the Claim to put an upper bound on the distance
between terms in the same row of the array. Let r > 1be an odd integer. Applying
(i) in the Claim, we have:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿r(n￿1) < ￿1(￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+1)
Observe that ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+1) can be written as
￿(r0￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿￿(r0￿1)(n￿1)+1) where r0 = r ￿1. Since r0 is an even integer,
we can apply (iii) to obtain:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿r(n￿1) < ￿2
1(￿(r￿3)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿2)(n￿1)+1):
Hence applying (i) and (iii) repeatedly, we conclude that:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿r(n￿1) < ￿r￿1
1 (￿h ￿ ￿n￿1)
= ￿r￿1
1 (
1
2
￿
1
2n￿h￿1)
< ￿r￿1
1 (
1
2
):
By the same argument ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 < ￿r￿1
1 (1
2) when r is
even. Moreover, from analogous arguments, we obtain that:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 < ￿r￿1
2 (
1
2
)
when r is odd and:
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿r(n￿1) < ￿r￿1
2 (
1
2
)
when r is even.
Let r be an odd integer. The left-most and right-most terms in row r are
￿(r(n￿1)and ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1respectively. Using the triangle inequality and the bounds
derived in the previous paragraph, it follows that:
jj￿r(n￿1) ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1jj ￿ jj￿r(n￿1) ￿ ￿r(n￿1)+hjj + jj￿r(n￿1)+h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1jj
<
1
2
(￿r￿1
1 + ￿r￿1
2 ):
If r is an even integer, and the left-most and right-most terms in row r are
￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1 and ￿(r(n￿1) respectively, one has:
jj￿r(n￿1) ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1jj ￿ jj￿r(n￿1) ￿ ￿r(n￿1)+n￿hjj + jj￿(r(n￿1)+n￿h ￿ ￿(r￿1)(n￿1)+1jj
<
1
2
(￿r￿1
1 + ￿r￿1
2 ):
30Note that the maximal di⁄erence of terms in row r is strictly less than 1
2 max[￿1;￿2]r￿1.
Pick an integer t such that t = r(n￿1) where r is an odd integer i.e. ￿t is the
left-most term in row r and m(t) = r ￿ 1. Let q = r0(n ￿ 1) where r0 > r. Note
that, by repeated application of the triangle inequality, it follows that jj￿t ￿ ￿qjj
is less than the sum of the di⁄erences between the left-most and right-most terms
of all rows starting from r + 1. Hence:
jj￿t ￿ ￿qjj <
1
2
(￿r
1 + ￿r+1
1 + ::::: + ￿r
2 + ￿r+1
2 :::::)
=
1
2
(
￿1
r
1 ￿ ￿1
+
￿2
r
1 ￿ ￿2
)
￿ ￿(r)
￿ ￿(m(t))
(note that we critically use the fact that ￿1 and ￿2 are strictly less than 1). Now
let ￿q be a term in row r0 where r0 > r. Applying the triangle inequality again,
we have:
jj￿t ￿ ￿qjj < ￿(m(t)) +
1
2
max[￿1;￿2]r￿1
< ￿(m(t)) +
1
2
max[￿1;￿2]m(t)
￿ ^ ￿(t):
Observe that ^ ￿(t) ! 0 as t ! 1. Pick " > 0 and let T be such that ^ ￿(t) < " for
all t > T. We have shown that jj￿T ￿￿qjj < " for all q > T. Hence the sequence
￿t is a Cauchy sequence and is convergent.
We now show that the sequence converges to 1
n. Suppose it converges to ￿. Let
tand k be positive integers such that t + 1 = k(n ￿ 1) and consider the following
sequence of di⁄erences.
￿t+1 ￿ ￿t =
1
2
(￿(k￿2)(n￿1)+1 ￿ ￿t) (10)
￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 =
1
2
(￿(k￿2)(n￿1)+2 ￿ ￿t￿1) (11)
::: = :::
￿t￿(n￿3) ￿ ￿t￿(n￿2) =
1
2
(￿(k￿1)(n￿1) ￿ ￿(k￿1)(n￿1)) (12)
￿t￿(n￿2) ￿ ￿t￿(n￿1) =
1
2
(￿(k￿2)(n￿1)+1 ￿ ￿(k￿1)(n￿1)￿1) (13)
::: = :::
￿n￿h+1 ￿ ￿n￿h =
1
2
(￿0 ￿ ￿n￿h) (14)
31It is clear from these (t￿(n￿h)) equalities that except for the ￿rst n￿2 negative
terms of the right hand sides, every positive term of the ￿rst n ￿ 1 lines has an
identical negative term in one of the lines n+1,...,2n. Hence, if we sum the equalities
(10)-(14), we get:
￿t+1 ￿ ￿n￿h =
1
2
(
n￿2 X
i=1
￿k(n￿1)+i)
Observe that ￿n￿h = 1=2. Also, f￿k(n￿1)+ig, for k = 1;:::, is a subsequence of
the original sequence for all i = 1;:::;n￿2. Since the original sequence converges
to ￿, these subsequences must also converge to ￿. Therefore by taking limits on
both sides of the equation above, we obtain ￿ ￿ 1=2 = ￿1=2(n ￿ 2)￿, so that
￿ = 1
n, as required.
Proof of lemma 3.
We only prove the ￿rst statement and distinguish three cases.
(a) A ￿ B [ fdg, in which case the proof is done.
(b) A ￿ B [ fdg. Then, by certainty equivalence, there exists e such that
feg ￿ fd;cg. By averaging, fdg ￿ feg ￿ fcg. By restricted independence,
B [ fdg ￿ B [ feg so that the statement A ￿ B [ feg follows.
(c) A ￿ B [ fdg. In that case the richness axiom applies and there is a
consequence f such that A ￿ B [ ffg and we proceed as in case (b).
Proof of lemma 4
Suppose ￿rst fcg ￿ fdg. By averaging, fbg ￿ fcg ￿ fdg. Since c 6= d, we
have c 6= b or d 6= b. Assume without loss of generality that c 6= b. By restricted
independence, B [fbg ￿ B [fcg. Therefore A[fag ￿ B [fbg ￿ B [fcg and,
by restricted independence, A [ fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;bg. By restricted independence
again, B [ fc;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg. Finally, by transitivity, A [ fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg.
Suppose now fcg 6￿ fdg and assume, without loss of generality, that fcg ￿
fdg. Two cases need to be considered.
1. Assume by contradiction that A [ fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg. Let us show that
there is a consequence dsuch that A [ fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg ￿ B [ fc;dg.
Choose a consequence u distinct from c such that fug ￿ fdg. The existence
of such a consequence is guaranteed by the fact that fcg ￿ fdg and, using
certainty equivalence, that one can always de￿ne u by fug ￿ fc;dg. By
averaging, one must have fcg ￿ fug ￿ fdg which, given the re￿ exivity of
%, implies that u is distinct from both c and d. By restricted independence,
one has B [ fc;ug ￿ B [ fc;dg. Two mutually exclusive cases can occur.
￿ B [ fc;ug - A [ fa;bg. By averaging and certainty equivalence, one
can ￿nd a consequence e such that A [ fa;bg ￿ e ￿ B [ fc;dg.
By Richness, there is d : B [ fc;dg ￿ feg. Hence A [ fa;bg ￿
B [ fc;dg ￿ B [ fc;dg
￿ A [ fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;ug. In this case, let d = u.
32By certainty equivalence, there is a consequence b such that fbg ￿ fc;dg.
Notice that we can always choose d so that d and b do not belong to B [
fcg[A[fag. By restricted independence, fbg ￿ fbg. By averaging, fbg ￿
fc;dg ￿ fb;bg ￿ fbg. By restricted independence, B[fc;dg ￿ B[fb;bg.
By restricted independence, A [ fa;bg ￿ A [ fa;bg and A [ fa;bg ￿
B[fb;bg. By transitivity, B[fc;dg ￿ A[fa;bg. But we have previously
shown that A [ fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg. A contradiction.
2. Assume by contradiction that A [ fa;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg. This case is treated
like the previous one.
Proof of lemma 5
Start with fbg ￿ fag % B [ fbg. By averaging, fbg ￿ B. Write Bas
B = fb1;:::;brg with fb1g - fb2g - ::: - fbrg. Let bj be such that fbjg ￿ fbg
and fbg - bi for all i > j. The existence of such a bj is guaranteed by averaging.
By certainty equivalence, one can ￿nd a consequence b0
j in X such that b0
j ￿ fb;bjg.
By Averaging, bj ￿ b0
j ￿ b. De￿ne A0 by A0 = B [fb0
jgnfbjg. By averaging and
transitivity, one has A0 ￿ B. By restricted independence, A0 [ fbg ￿ B [ fbg.
By construction, A0 [ fbjg = B [ fb0
jg. By restricted independence, B [ fbg ￿
B [ fb0
jg. Hence A0 [ fbg ￿ B [ fbg ￿ B [ fb0
jg = A0 [ fbjg. By richness,
there exists some consequence a0such that A0 [ fa0g ￿ B [ fbg. By restricted
independence, one has b ￿ a0 ￿ b0
j, which, given the de￿nition of A0, establish
that a0 = 2 A0.
Proof of lemma 6
We prove only part (i) of condition C, the proof of the other part being similar.
Suppose that we have fag % B[fbg, fbg ￿ fc;dg, fbg ￿ fag, b = 2 Band fc;dg\
B = ; for consequences a, b, c, d in X and some ￿nite subset B of X. By Lemma
5, there exists a ￿nite set A0and a consequence a0such that A0 [ fa0g ￿ B [ fbg,
a0 = 2 A0and #A0 = #B. By Lemma 4, we must have A0 [ fa0;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg.
By certainty equivalence, there exists a consequence a00such that a00 ￿ A0 [ fa0g.
By transitivity, fbg ￿ fag % A0 [ fa0g ￿ fa00g. By attenuation, A0 [ fa0;bg ￿
fa00;bg. By transitivity, fa00;bg ￿ B [ fc;dg. Restricted independence and
fag % fa00g imply fb;ag % fb;a00g. Transitivity ￿nally yields fa;bg ￿ B[fc;dg.
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